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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GOLDEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES L.C, aka
GOLDEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES LLC

ADDENDUM

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

MICHAEL STRAND and CARI ALLEN,
Defendants and Appellants.

District Court No. 070700488
Appellate Court No. 2008083 8-CA

APPEAL FROM SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE JUDGE GLEN R. DAWSON, PRESIDING

James C. Swindler (#3177)
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler
175 East, 400 South., Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ph: (801) 524-1000
Fax: (801)514-ioV\

Michael Strand and Cari Allen
P.O. Box 1304
Centerville, Utah 84014
Ph: (801) 674-9659
Fax:(801)397-1319

Wayne Petty ( # l w )
Moyle & Draper
175 East, 400 South., Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ph: (801) 5av- e>i£o
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ADDENDUM
1.

Utah Code §78-36-10.3. §78-27-56. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) and (c)

and, Utah R.Evid. 613(b).
Courtesy Copies of Documents Supporting Defendants Claims for Oral Argument filed
07/25/08
2.

April 25, 1983 $2,000 check by Strand (d.b.a. B.I. Associates) to Nupetco

Associates and (Wayne Petty) Moyle & Draper for legal fee's / Excerpts of Attorney Dan
Jackson's billing statements dated June 30,1985 [sic] 1983 and November 20, 1985.
3.

Affidavit of Michael Strand dated March 20,1985. (Civil No. C 85-03 51W)

4.

Second Amended Complaint dated September 23,1985. (Civil No. C 85-0351W)

5.

Affidavit of Lohr Livingston dated March 1985 (Civil No. C 85-0351W)

6.

Attorney Dan Jackson's Affidavit dated February 28,2008.
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(b) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with
Subsection (2)(a):
(i) the court shall determine who has the right of
occupancy during the litigation's pendency; and
(ii) if the court determines that all issues between
the parties can be adjudicated without further proceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues and
enter judgment on the merits.
(3) (a) In an action for unlawful detainer in which the
claim is for nuisance and alleges an act that would be
considered criminal under the laws of this state, the court
shall hold an evidentiary hearing within ten days after
the day on which the complaint is filed to determine
whether the alleged act occurred.
(b) The hearing required by Subsection (3)(a) shall be
set at the time the complaint is filed and notice of the
hearing shall be served upon the defendant with the
summons at least three calendar days before the scheduled time of the hearing.
(c) If the court, at an evidentiary hearing held in
accordance with Subsection (3)(a), determines that it is
more likely than not that the alleged act occurred, the
court shall issue an order of restitution.
(d) If an order of restitution is issued in accordance
with Subsection (3)(c), a constable or the sheriff of the
county where the property is situated shall return possession of the property to the plaintiff immediately.
(e) The court may allow a period of up to 72 hours
before restitution may be made under Subsection (3)(d) if
the court determines the time is appropriate under the
circumstances.
(f) At the evidentiary hearing held in accordance with
Subsection (3)(a), if the court determines that all issues
between the parties can be adjudicated without further
proceedings, the court shall adjudicate those issues and
enter judgment on the merits.
(g) "An act that would be considered criminal under the
laws of this state" under Subsection (3)(a) includes only
the following:
(i) an act that would be considered a felony under
the laws of this state;
(ii) an act that would be considered criminal affecting the health or safety of a tenant, the landlord, the
landlord's agent, or other person on the landlord's
property;
(iii) an act that would be considered criminal that
causes damage or loss to any tenant's property or the
landlord's property;
(iv) a drug- or gang-related act that would be
considered criminal;
(v) an act or threat of violence against any tenant
or other person on the premises, or against the
landlord or the landlord's agent; and
(vi) any other act that would be considered criminal that the court determines directly impacts the
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by any tenant.
™) (a) At any hearing held in accordance with this chapter
m which the tenant after receiving notice fails to appear,
the court shall issue an order of restitution.
(b) If an order of restitution is issued in accordance
^ t h Subsection (4)(a), a constable or the sheriff of the
county where the property is situated shall return possession of the property to the plaintiff immediately.
V c o u r t adjudicating matters under this chapter may
e
other orders as are appropriate and proper.
2007
QS

•10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent
~7 Immediate enforcement — Treble damages.
va) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon

78-36-10.5

(b) A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall
include an order for the restitution of the premises as
provided m Section 78-36-10.5.
(c) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of
the lease or agreement under which the property is held,
or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment shall
also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(d) (i) A forfeiture under Subsection (l)(c) does not
release a defendant from any obligation for payments
on a lease for the remainder of the lease's term.
(ii) Subsection (l)(d)(i) does not change any obligation on either party to mitigate damages.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without
a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the
damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at
trial;
(d) the amounts due under the contract, if the alleged
unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of
amounts due under the contract; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for
the rent, for three times the amount of the damages assessed
under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(e), and for reasonable
attorney fees.
(4) (a) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer, execution
upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the
entry of the judgment.
(b) In all cases, the judgment may be issued and
enforced immediately.
2007
78-36-10.5. Order of restitution — Service — Enforcement — Disposition of personal property —
Hearing.
(1) Each order of restitution shall:
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises, remove
his personal property, and restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be forcibly removed by a sheriff or
constable;
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set by the
court for the defendant to vacate the premises, which
shall be three calendar days following service of the order,
unless the court determines that a longer or shorter
period is appropriate under the circumstances; and
(c) advise the defendant of the defendant's right to a
hearing to contest the manner of its enforcement.
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form for the
defendant to request a hearing as listed on the form shall
be served in accordance with Section 78-36-6 by a person
authorized to serve process pursuant to Subsection 7812a-2(l). If personal service is impossible or impracticable, service may be made by:
(i) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the
defendant's last-known address and posting a copy of
the order and the form at a conspicuous place on the
premises; or
(ii) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the
commercial tenant defendant's last-known place of
business and posting a copy of the order and the form
at a conspicuous place on the business premises.
(b) A request for hearing by the defendant may not stay
enforcement of the restitution order unless:
(i) the defendant furnishes a corporate bond, cash
bond, certified funds, or a property bond to the clerk
of the court in an amount approved by the court

78-27-50.5

JUDICIAL CODE

(a) local police;
(b) a sheriff;
(c) a peace officer;
(d) a city attorney;
(e) a county attorney;
(f) a district attorney;
(g) the attorney general;
(h) the Department of Public Safety;
(i) the Office of Recovery Services of the Department of
Human Services;
(j) the Insurance Department;
(k) the Department of Commerce;
(1) the Benefit Payment Control Unit or the Payment
Error Prevention Unit of the Department of Workforce
Services;
(m) the state auditor; or
(n) the State Tax Commission.
(2) Except for t h e Office of Recovery Services, if a governmental entity listed in Subsection (1) seeks a record, the entity
shall obtain t h e record as follows:
(a) if the record is a nonprotected record, by request in
writing that:
(i) certifies that an official investigation is being
conducted; and
(ii) is signed by a representative of the governmental entity that is conducting the official investigation;
or
(b) if the record is a protected record, by obtaining:
(i) a subpoena authorized by statute; or
(ii) other legal process:
(A) ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction; a n d
(B) served upon t h e financial institution.
(3) If the Office of Recovery Services seeks a record, it shall
obtain t h e record p u r s u a n t to:
(a) Subsection 62A-11-104(7);
(b) Section 62A-11-304.1;
(c) Section 62A-11-304.5; or
(d) Title IV, P a r t D of the Social Security Act as codified
in 42 U.S.C. 651 et seq.
(4) A financial institution may not give notice to any person
named or referenced within t h e record disclosed pursuant to
Subsection (2)(a).
(5) In accordance with Section 78-27-48, the agency conducting t h e official investigation t h a t obtains a record from a
financial institution under this section shall reimburse the
financial institution for costs reasonably and directly incurred
by t h e financial institution.
2005
78-27-50.5. Liability of financial institutions.
A financial institution is not liable to any person named or
referenced within a record:
(1) for a n y disclosure t h a t is t h e result of a subpoena,
order, or request made pursuant to Sections 78-27-45
through 78-27-50 if the financial institution reasonably
believes t h a t t h e subpoena, order, or request is properly
m a d e under Sections 78-27-45 through 78-27-50; or
(2) for a n y disclosure or action taken in good faith
p u r s u a n t to a data match or administrative subpoena
provided for by t h e statutes listed in Subsection 78-2750(3).

1999

78-27-51. Inherent risks of skiing — Public policy.
The Legislature finds t h a t the sport of skiing is practiced by
a large n u m b e r of residents of U t a h and attracts a large
n u m b e r of nonresidents, significantly contributing to the
economy of this state. It further finds that few insurance
carriers are willing to provide liability insurance protection to
ski area operators a n d that t h e premiums charged by those
carriers have risen sharply in recent years due to confusion as

1146

to whether a skier assumes t h e risks inherent in t h e sport of
skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to clarify the law
in relation to skiing injuries a n d the risks inherent in that
sport, to establish as a matter of law t h a t certain risks are
inherent in that sport, a n d to provide that, as a matter of
public policy, no person engaged in t h a t sport shall recover
from a ski operator for injuries resulting from those inherent
risks.
1979
78-27-52. Inherent risks of skiing — Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or
conditions which a r e an integral p a r t of the sport of
recreational, competitive, or professional skiing, including, b u t not limited to:
(a) changing weather conditions;
(b) snow or ice conditions as they exist or may
change, such a s hard pack, powder, packed powder,
wind pack, corn, crust, slush, cut-up snow, or machine-made snow;
(c) surface or subsurface conditions such as bare
spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, streambeds,
cliffs, trees, a n d other natural objects;
(d) variations or steepness in terrain, whether
n a t u r a l or as a result of slope design, snowmaking or
grooming operations, and other terrain modifications
such as terrain parks, and terrain features such as
jumps, rails, fun boxes, and all other constructed and
natural features such as half pipes, quarter pipes, or
freestyle-bump terrain;
(e) impact with lift towers and other structures
and their components such as signs, posts, fences or
enclosures, hydrants, or water pipes;
(f) collisions with other skiers;
(g) participation in, or practicing or training for.
competitions or special events; and
(h) t h e failure of a skier to ski within the skier's
own ability.
(2) "Injury" means any personal injury or property
damage or loss.
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for
the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing, nordic,
freestyle, or other types of ski jumping, using skis, sled,
tube, snowboard, or any other device.
(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area
operator to be used for skiing, nordic, freestyle, or other
type of ski jumping, and snowboarding.
(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and then
agents, officers, employees or representatives, who operate a ski area.
200«
78-27-53. Inherent risks of skiing — Bar against claim
or recovery from operator for injury from,
risks inherent in sport.
Notwithstanding anything in Sections 78-27-37 through
78-27-43 to the contrary, no skier m a y make any claim
against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injurf
resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing.
UK
78-27-54. I n h e r e n t r i s k s of s k i i n g — Trail boards liste
i n g i n h e r e n t risks a n d l i m i t a t i o n s o n liability
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more
prominent locations within each ski area which shall include
a list of the inherent risks of skiing, and t h e limitations ot
liability of ski area operators, a s defined in this act. 1W
78-27-55. Repealed.

m

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action «
defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, t h e court shall award reasonable atto^
n e / s fees to a prevailing party if the court determines thattki
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action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited
fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1).
1988

#
78-27-56.5. Attorney's f e e s — Reciprocal rights t o rec o v e r attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party
that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note,
written contract, or other writing executed after April 28,
1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
1986
78-27-57. Attorney's f e e s a w a r d e d t o state f u n d e d
a g e n c y i n a c t i o n against state or s u b d i v i s i o n
— Forfeit of appropriated m o n i e s .
Any agency or organization receiving state funds which, as
a result of its suing the state, or political subdivision thereof,
receives attorney's fees and costs as all or part of a settlement
or award, shall forfeit to the General Fund, from its appropriated monies, an amount equal to the attorney's fees received.
1981

78-27-58. R e p e a l e d .

2003

78-27-59. I m m u n i t y for t r a n s i e n t shelters.
(1) As used in this section, "transient shelter" means any
person which provides shelter, food, clothing, or other products or services without consideration to indigent persons.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), all transient
shelters, owners, operators, and employees of transient shelters, and persons who contribute products or services to
transient shelters, are immune from suit for damages or
injuries arising out of or related to the damaged or injured
person's use of the products or services provided by the
transient shelter.
(3) This section does not prohibit an action against a person
for damages or injury intentionally caused by that person or
resulting from his gross negligence.
1986
78-27-60.

Limited i m m u n i t y for a r c h i t e c t s a n d engin e e r s i n s p e c t i n g e a r t h q u a k e damage.
(1) A professional engineer licensed under Title 58, Chapter
22, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors Licensing Act,
or an architect licensed under Title 58, Chapter 3a, Architects
Licensing Act, who provides structural inspection services at
the scene of a declared national, state, or local emergency
caused by a major earthquake is not liable for any personal
injury, wrongful death, or property damage caused by the good
faith inspection for structural integrity or nonstructural elements affecting health and safety of a structure used for
human habitation or owned by a public entity if the inspection
is performed:
(a) voluntarily, without compensation or the expectation of compensation;
(b) at the request of a public official or city or county
building inspector acting in an official capacity; and
(c) within 30 days of the earthquake.
(2) The immunity provided for in Subsection (1) does not
apply to gross negligence or willful misconduct.
1997

78-27-61

(a) (i) "Amusement park" means any permanent indoor or outdoor facility or park where amusement
rides are available for use by the general public.
(ii) "Amusement park" does not include a ski resort, a traveling show, carnival, or fair.
(b) "Amusement ride" means a device or attraction at
an amusement park which carries or conveys passengers
along, around, or over a fixed or restricted route or course
or allows the passenger to steer or guide it within an
established area for the purpose of giving its passengers
amusement, pleasure, thrills, or excitement. "Amusement
ride" includes:
(i) any water-based recreational attraction, including all water slides, wave pools, and water parks; and
(ii) typical rides, including roller coasters, whips,
ferris wheels, and merry-go-rounds.
(c) "Intoxicated" means a person is under the influence
of alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree t h a t
the person may endanger himself or another, in a public
place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other persons.
(d) "Operator" means any person, firm, or corporation
t h a t owns, leases, manages, or operates an amusement
p a r k or amusement ride and all employees and agents of
the amusement park.
(e) "Rider" means any person who is:
(i) waiting in the immediate vicinity of an amusem e n t ride in order to get on the ride;
(ii) in the process of leaving the ride but remains in
its immediate vicinity; or
(iii) a passenger or participant on an amusement
ride.
(2) An amusement park shall inform riders in writing,
where appropriate, of the nature of the ride, including factors
which would assist riders in determining whether they should
participate in the ride activity and the rules concerning
conduct on each ride. Information concerning the rules of
conduct may be given verbally at the beginning of each ride
segment or posted in writing conspicuously at the entrance to
each ride.
(3) Riders are responsible for obeying the posted rules a n d
verbal instructions of the amusement ride operator.
(4) A rider may not:
(a) board or dismount from an amusement ride except
at a designated area;
(b) board an amusement ride if he has a physical
condition that may be aggravated by participation on t h e
ride;
(c) disconnect, disable, or attempt to disconnect or
disable, any safety device, seat belt, harness, or other
restraining device before, during, or after movement of
the amusement ride has started except at the express
instruction of the operator;
(d) throw or expel any object from an amusement ride;
(e) act in any manner contrary to posted or oral rules
while boarding, riding, or dismounting from an amusement ride; or
(f) engage in any reckless act or activity which m a y
injure himself or others.
(5) A rider may not board or attempt to board any amusement ride if he is intoxicated.
(a) An operator of an amusement park ride may p r e vent a rider who is perceptibly or apparently intoxicated
from boarding an amusement ride.
(b) An operator who prevents a rider from boarding a n
amusement ride under this section, is not criminally or

Rule 56. Summary judgment
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary
judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify
to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order

Rule 613. Prior statements of witnesses.
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examining a witness concerning a
prior statement made by the witness, whether written or not, the statement need not be
shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but on request the same
shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic evidence of a
prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded
an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an
opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise
require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in
Rule 801(d)(2).
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. Subsection (a) abandons the position in Queens
Case, 129 English Reports 976 (1820), requiring that the cross-examiner, prior to
examining a witness about his written statement, must first show the statement to the
witness and is comparable to the substance of Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971). The substance of Subsection (b) was formerly in Rule 22(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971).

Judson T.Pitts (9946)
The Rose & Pitts Law Office
45 W. Sego Lily Dr. Ste #201
Sandy, Utah 84070
Email: Judsonpitts @ hotmail.com
Telephone: (801) 265-8200
Fax: (801) 352-7657
Attorney for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, BOUNTIFUL DIVISION

GOLSEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES, L.C.,
AKA

COURTESY COPIES OF. DOCUMENTS
SUPPORTING DEFENDANTS CLAIMS
FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

GOLDEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES, L.L.C.,
Civil No. 070700488

Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL W. STRAND AND CARI ALLEN,

Defendants.

Judge. Glen R. Dawson

Attached hereto are courtesy copies of documents that support the facts, arguments, and
contentions set forth in the Defendant's Rule 59 Motion for New Trial and to Amend Judgment
for Irregularities in the Proceeding. These documents are referenced in the Motion, and may be

referenced during Oral Argument. The documents are provided in whole, rather than in abridged
format, so that the context surrounding them may be fully discerned. Accordingly, because of
their voluminous nature, they are provided in this format.
Dated this J7&_ dav of July. 2008
JUDSON PITTS
Attorney for Defendants

1.

Golden Meadows Properties' Objection to Machinery & Hardware Supply's Motion for

Relief From the Automatic Stay filed on May 6, 2003. Order For Relief From the Automatic
Stay filed June 4, 2003 (Case No. 02-37988JAB).
2.

July 21, 2000 personal guarantee document. Trustee's Deed filed on November 19, 2003

and Nupetco Associates check no. 7075 to Ralph Petty Esq dated November 20, 2003. Page one
of the Abstract of Title for the Property.
3.

Affidavits of John Caine, Nathan Drage and Howard Johnson filed September 10, 2007

(Golden Meadows Properties vs. Cari Allen - Case No. 040700433 Judge Memmott).
4.

Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment filed October 31, 2007 and

Order filed November 1, 2007 (Golden Meadows Properties vs. Cari Allen - Case No.
040700433 Judge Memmott).
5.

Golden Meadows Complaint against Allen dated June 22, 2004 and served on March 25,

2008 (Case no. 040700433 Judge Memmott).
6.

Cari Allen's Verified Answer and Counterclaim dated April 23, 2008 (Golden Meadows

Properties vs. Cari Allen - Case no. 040700433 Judge Memmott).
7.

Attorney Dan Jackson's Affidavit dated February 28, 2008 filed by the Defendants in

Opposition to the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael Strand and Cari Allen and in
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (Golden Meadows v. Michael Strand and Cari
Allen - Case No. 070700488).
8.

Excerpts of Attorney Dan Jackson's billing statements dated June 30, 1985 and

November 20,1985.
9.

Partial accounting list between Neuman Petty et al and Michael Strand et al titled

"From June 1, 1982" with the notation that on April 25, 1983 $2,000 was paid by Strand et al to
Nupetco Associates and (Wayne Petty) Moyle & Draper for legal fee's and supporting check

number 0211922.
10.

Excerpts of the Amended Counterclaim filed by Petty et al dated June 19, 2008 (pg. 6 -

with a September 3, 1987 notation that Nupetco Associates paid Strand's legal fees to Daniel W.
Jackson). Michael Strand, individually and as successor in interest to MINGO OIL COMPANY,
MINGO OIL PRODUCERS, and other MICHAEL STRAND entities v. NEUMAN PETTY,
NUPETCO ASSOCIATES, and KAMCO WYOMING CORPORTION, and other NEUMAN
PETTY entities (Case No. 070915796 Judge Iwasaki)
11.

Affidavit of Michael Strand dated March 20, 1985 (Michael Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary

Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-03515W).
12.

Affidavit of Lohr Livingston dated March 19, 1985 (Michael Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary

Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-0351W).
13.

Affidavit of David Floor dated March 20, 1985 (Michael Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary

Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-0315W).
14.

Affidavit of Michael Strand dated July 10, 1985 (Michael Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary

Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C895-0315W).
15.

Affidavit of David Floor dated July 10,1985 (Michael Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary Harris

and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-0315W).
16.

Complaint filed by Michael Strand against The Citizens Bank (Michael Strand vs. The

Citizens Bank - Civil No. 1-37731) dated July 23,1985.
17.

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Strand dated July 23, 1985. TRO

entered on July 25,1985 and $20,000 bond posted by Nupetco Associates for Strand (Michael
Strand vs. The Citizens Bank - Civil No. 1-37731).
18.

Motion to Join Nupetco Associates as Additional Plaintiff dated June 28,1985 (Michael

Strand v. Bill Taylor, Gary Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-0315W).

19.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Michael Strand on September 5, 1985 and,

Minute Entry dated September 4, 1985 denying the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Michael
Strand vs. The Citizens Bank - Civil No. 1-37731).
20.

Stipulation and Motion for Judgment of Dismissal dated September 12, 1985 and

Judgment of Dismissal. Order Authorizing Release of Funds entered September 12, 1985. Check
No. 1114 for $20,000 from the Davis County Clerk to Michael Strand and copy of the check
endorsed to Neuman Petty by Michael Strand (Michael Strand vs. The Citizens Bank - Civil No.
1-37731).
21.

Second Amended Complaint against Bill Taylor, Gary Harris and The Citizen's Bank

dated September 23, 1985 and Ruling entered September 15, 1989 (Michael Strand and Nupetco
Associates v. Bill Taylor, Gary Harris and The Citizens Bank - Civil No. C85-0315W).
22.

Withdrawal of Counsel filed by Attorney Dan Jackson dated April 12, 1988 (Michael

Strand vs. The Citizens Bank - Civil No. 1-37731.)
23.

Ruling by the Honorable Judge Morris entered on June 4, 2008 (DIANE DIMEO,

personal Representative of the Estate of Eleanor Amelia Millie Newberry Strand, Deceased v.
Nupetco Associates - Case No. 060700354).
24.

Correspondence between attorney's Wayne Petty and Ralph Petty, Sidney Baucom, and

Frank Wilkins dated December 8, 2005. Correspondence between attorney Mark Tolman and
Michael Strand dated May, 10, 2007. Correspondence between James Swindler and Mark
Tolman dated July 12, 2007.
25.

Verified Complaint Michael Strand, individually and as successor in interest to MINGO

OIL COMPANY, MINGO OIL PRODUCERS, and other MICHAEL STRAND entities v.
NEUMAN PETTY, NUPETCO ASSOCIATES, and KAMCO WYOMING CORPORTION, and
other NEUMAN PETTY entities (Case No. 070915796 Judge Iwasaki) filed November 6, 2007.
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STRINGHAM, SABIN, BRADLEY & ARROWSMITH
A PROFESSIONAL
RICHARD H . B R A D L E Y *
J A M E S A. A R R O W S M I T H •
OAN)ZL W. J A C K S O N *
EDWARD L. C U S S O L D

40

CORPORATION

E A S T SOUTH
SUITE

TEMPLE

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
(SOU 3 2 8 - l S O i

OF COUNSEL
D O N A . STRINGHAM
N E I L R. S A 9 I N

June 30, 1983
Michael W. Strand
P. 0. Box 2519
Salt Lake City, UT

84110
STATEMENT

Balance from April 30, 1983 billing:

$4,591.00

Payment of 5-17-83

(1,000.00)

Payment of 5-31-83

(4,000.00)

May billings:
DWJ FEES
PARALEGAL FEES

3,224.75
323.50

June billings:
DWJ FEES

2,250.00

Clerk Fees

2,470.00

Costs Advanced
Copies
Filing fees
TOTAL DUE

S4I03

3IO

S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H 84111
(SOI) 3 6 3 - 1 9 1 9

•A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

M c C U N S OFFICE
ZOO NORTH MAIN

125.05
32.00
$7,925.55

DWJ

MAY

STRAND
5-2-83
8:45-9:00

I*

*

.25 hour

Phone conversation with Mike re:
Mingo Oil hearing.

10:15-11:00

.75

Preparing for hearing.

11:00-12:30

1.50

Hearing re: Mingo Oil Producers

12:30-1:00

.50

Rehash of hearing.

3:30-4:30

1.00

Editing memorandum and affidavit for
opposition to Hammons motion for
summary judgment in promissory note case,

4:30-5:00

.50

Meeting wiht Strand and Newman Petty.

2.25 hou

Meeting before and then hearing in
Hammons motion for summary judgment.

5-3-83
9:30-11:45
3:15-3:45

..-Responses to~~ requests foV production
of documents. \
\

.50

_ \

1.00

Research re: relief from summary judgment,

5-4-83
9:30-9:45

.25

Phone conversation with Strand re
urrent developments.

4:00-4:30

.50

4:30-6:00

1.50

4:45-5:45

3:45-4:00
5-5-83
9:30- 11:00

.25

<

Bullshit.

>

Strategy meeting with Wayne Petty and
Newman Petty, Strand.
Heariang on continuance of Adv. Pro.
Mingo Oil hearing.

1.50

Travel to Farmington, hearing on Mingo
Oil; meeting with First Sec. Bank.
Mark Carpenter.

12:00-2:00

2.00

Meeting with Strand, John Caine re:
upcoming Mingo hearing.!

3:40-3:55

.25

Phone conersation with Bob Cleary re;
Prarie Gold.

4:15-4:30

.25

Drafting subpoena for William Shaw.

4:30-5:00

.50

Drafting Subpoena for William Shaw.

5:30-5:55

.50

Phone conversation with Rolf Berger

1

RAND-

A'

.AY

DWJ

fl 0

<

•6-83
11:15-12:30

1.25

Meeting with William Shaw re: First Sec.
Bank's accounting of Jammons funds.

12:30- 2:00

1.50

REviewing with Strand, Wayne Petty and
Newman Petty the information from First
Sec. Bank.

2:35-2:50

.25

Reviewing proposed order submitted
in the promissory note case-Hammons.

3:15-4:15

1.00

Reviewing transcript of Hearing in Adv,
Pro. 82PM-0203.

-11-83
9:00-10:00

1.00

Review transcript of Davis county hearing.

10:00-11:00

1.00

Attend hearing Mingo oil Prod. vs.
Trustee.

11:00-11:30

.50

Review current position and future strategy

.75

Drafting notice of disclosure haering
research on notice.

11:00-11:30

.50

Finalizing notice of disclosure.

3:00-4:15

1.25

Reviewing money problems and related
matters for meeting with Petty.

4:45-9:13 I

4.50

Meeting with Strand, Petty, Wayne Petty, re
thinas to do.

5-20-83
4:00-4:15

.25

Phone conversation Wayne Petty.

2:00-3:00

1.00

3:00-5:15

1.

4:00-6:45

2.75

.-16-83
9:15-10:00

5-25-83
8:00-8:15

Drafting new repayment agreement.
25

25

Meeting with Wayne Petty re: repayment
agreement, relationship of Petty-Strand.
Waiting for Mike until 5:15 then meeting wi
Wayne, Newman Petty and Mike re:
agreement.
Meeting with clerk re
of ETC judgment.

Strand reconsiderat

DWJ
STRAND

MAY

.,7-16
3i

•/

bV

5-25-83
3:45-4:00

.25

Phone conversation.

5-26-83
10:45-11:00

.25

Phone conversation with Mike re: recent
developments.

4:15-4:30

25

op*

Phone conversation with Wayne Petty
re: Heyrend motion.

5:00-5:15

.25

Phone conversation Strand re:
repayment agreement.

5-27-83
11:00-11:30

.50

Reveiwing Adv. Pro. NO $940 file,

3.50

Meeting with Strand, Petty, re:
finalizing agreements.

5-30-83
10:15=12:30

2.25

Drafting reply letter to Mike
re: reply to Barbers letters.

5-31-83
9:30-10:30

1.00

Attend supp order hearing Hammons.

.25

Phone conversation Dwayne Gillman
re: objection to disclosure.

.75

Edit letter to Mike Sheppard.

3:30-7:00

12:15-12:30
6-1-83
9:00-9:45

TOTAL DWJ

42.75 hours at 75.00 ea. = 3,206.25

Shelley
5- 6-83
10:30-11:15

.75

5-16-83
12:00-7:00

7.00

Total

Shelley

Sheppard

Getting Shaw subp-oef

ued.

Putting together and mialing of Notice
of hearing fob-^lan of Reorganization.
7.75 hours at 30.00 = 232.50

Law Office

JACKSON & WILKINSON
A Professional Corporation
40 East South Temple, Suite 310
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 538-0645

Daniel W. Jackson

November 20, 1985
Michael Strand
P. 0. Box 2519
Salt Lake City, UT

84111
S T A T E M E N T

FOR SERVICES RENDERED through November 15. 1985:
ATTORNEY'S FEES:
Daniel W. Jackson
101.5 hrs @ $100.00 $10,150.00
Jeffrey W. Wilkinson 84.45 hrs §
70.00
5,911.50
Donna Somma
16.
hrs @
25.00
400.00
COSTS ADVANCED:
Phone calls, service and filing fees
PREVIOUS BALANCE DUE
PAYMENT (thank you)
CREDIT

9,461.32
13,000.00
(3,538.68)

TOTAL BALANCE DUE AND OWING
An itemization of
furnished upon any request

the

288.05

services

$13,210.87
rendered

will

be

DWJ TIME
Strand

11/1

9:15-9:30

.25

Strand

11/1

2-3

1.00

Strand

11/3

2:30-3:30

1.00

Strand

11/3

4-5

1.00

Strand

11/4

9:30-11

2.00

Strand

11/7

1:45-3

1.25

Strand

10/4

2:30-3:30

1.00

Strand

11/3

4-5

1.00

Strand

11/8

5-5:30

.50

Strand

11/9

9:30-10

.50

Strand

11/10

8:30-9

.50

Strand

11/10

12-1:45

Strand

11/10

4-4:30

.50

Strand

11/11

10-10:15

.25

Strand

11/11

1:30-2

.50

Strand

11/11

2-3

Strand

11/17

3-4

Strand

11/21

10-11

Strand

11/21

12:30-1

.50

Strand

11/21

2-2:30

.50

Strand

11/21

6-7:45

1.75

Strand

11/18

10:30-11

11/22

11-12

Strand

1.75

1.00

1.00

1.00

.50
1.00

Phone conversation with MiH
re settlement with trustee
Meeting with Ron Jackson II
representative
Finalizing settlement of cm
suit
Trustee
Meeting
about
contempt action re letter \
creditors
Drafting settlement agreemer
with trustee
Meeting with Dwayne Gillman I
settlement
Meeting
with
Mike
Re n(
cases, minutemen settlement
Discuss
opt-ions
to
prevei
enforcement
of
Minutem*
judgment
Phone
conversations
wit
Michael Heyrend and Mike i
Settlement of Minutement suit
Phone conservation with Wayr
Petty re settlement agreement
Phone
conversation
i
settlement
and
bargainii
position with Petty
Meeting
with
Wayne
Pett}
Newman,
and
Strand
i
settlement
agreement
wit
trustee
Phone conversation
re Pett
problem
Phone conversation with Mi!<
re settlement Nupecto sale
Phone conversation with Duar
re exclusion of Petty frc
settlement
Phone conversation Wayne Pett
re Terms of settlement ar
exclusion
of
Petty
frc
settement agreement
Phone conversation with Wayr
petty and judge Wilkins r
settlement
Meeting with Dwayne Gillman i
settlement
agreemer
Editing
settlement
in Overland Dome
agreemer
Editing
settlement
in Overland Dome
Editing, redrafting settlemer
agreement re Overland Dome
Phone
conversation
i
settlement
agreement
wit
Hammons
Editing, settlement agreement

DANIEL W. JACKSON
BRADLEY, ARROWSMITH & JACKSON
40 East South Temple, S u i t e 310
S o l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111
Telephone (801) 363-1919

CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
Central

Division

MICHAEL STRAND,
AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,

vs.

BILL TAYLOR, GARY HARRIS,
and THE CITIZENS BANK,

C i v i l No. C 8 5 - 0 3 1 5 W

Defendants,
AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Comes

ss

now Michael

Strand,

being

first

duly

s w o r n , de-

poses end s a y s :

1,

Affiant

is

the

2.

During November

Plaintiff

in

the

above-entitled

matter,

1984, Affiant notified

Defendant

Gary Harris that Defendant The Citizens Bank (Citizens) was in
possession
Company,

of 40,500

shares

of common

stock

of Global Oil

3,

On February 7, 1985, Affiant caused demand to be

made on Defendant Bill Taylor for the return of said stock,

4,

On February 26, 1985, Defendant Taylor responded to

Affiant's prior demand and stated that the stock in auestion had
been sold and the proceeds applied

to the loan between Plain-

tiff and Defendant Citizens,

5,

On February 22, 1982, Plaintiff executed a Promis-

sory Note whereby he promised to pay Defendant Citizens $390,000,
Said Promissory Note obligation was secured by a Trust Deed on
Plaintiff's residence and by an airplane hangar located at the
Salt Lake International Airport.

6,

At no time did Affiant authorize the sale of said

stock or the application

of the proceeds of that

unauthoized

sale to the loan in auestion,

7,

At no time were

the 40,500 shares of Global Oil

Company stock pledged as security for the repayment of the loan,

8,
Defendants

By agreement dated October 11, 1984, Plaintiff ana
renewed

the obligation

evidenced

by the

Promissory

Note,

9,

At the time of the unauthorized sale of the stock

in auestion, Plaintiff had complied with all the terms of the
October extension.
-2-

10.

Following his written demand, Affiant had a tele-

phone conversation with Defendant Taylor in which Affiant again
reauesteti the return of the stock.
Defendant Taylor asked Affiant
payments on the obligation

During that

conversation,

if he had made any

evidenced

additional

by the Promissory

Note,

Affiant responded that he had not made any payments pending the
return o x the stock.

Defendant Taylor stated that basea on the

circumstances he would notice the Affiant's house for Trustees
sale,

11,
sale scheduled

On February
for March

21, 1985, said Notice of Trustee's
21, 1985 was attached

residence by Defendant Citizens.

to

Affiant's

Affiant does not have suffi-

cient funds available to purchase the house at the Trustee's
sale,
sell

Affiant also believes that Defendant Citizens intends to
Plaintiff's

airplane

hangar

located

at

the

Salt

Lake

International Airport,

12.

Affiant considered the statements by Defendant cs

a threat that if Affiant did not ratify the unauthorized sale of
the stock and the application of the proceeds therefrom to his
indebtedness, Defendants would sell his residence at a Trustee's
Sale and thereby cause substantial

irreparable harm to his fi-

nancial condition; reputation and personal relationships,

13,
1981.

Said

$428,400,

Affiant had an appraisal done on his residence in
Appraisal

shows

the residence

to be valued at

Citizens presently holds a secured position behid a

first mortgage of approximately $60,000,00.

Dated this 2/~M day of March, 1985,

MICHAEL STRAND

Subscribed

and sworn

to before me this S>L1ln day of

March, 1985,

NOTARY PUBLIC, residing ct
My Commission Expires:

JrJ/7//

^^/^'^

<'f/tnJ>

DANIEL W. JACKSON
JEFFREY W. WILKINSON
JACKSON & WILKINSON
40 E a s t S o u t h T e m p l e , S u i t e 310
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111
Telephone (801) 538-0645
Attorney for Michael Strand
Wayne G. P e t t y
MOYLE & DRAPER

600 Deseret Plaza
N. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone (801) 521-0250
Attorney for Nupeco Associates
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
Central Division
MICHAEL STRAND and NUPETCO
ASSOCIATES, A Utah Limited
Partnership,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

]
Civil No. C85-0315W.. Q

BILL TAYLOR, GARY HARRIS,
and THE CITIZENS BANK,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs,
attorney, Daniel

W.

Michael

Strand,

Jackson, and

by

Nupetco

and

through

his

Associates, by and

through its attorney, Wayne Petty, respectively, Complain and
allege against the Defendants as follows:

JURISDICTION

1.

Plaintiff, Michael Strand, is a resident of Utah,

residing at 1199 South 1500 East, Bountiful, Utah.

2.
with

Nupetco Associates

is a Utah Limited Partnership

its principal place of business at 2006 South 900 East,

Salt Lake City, Utah.

3.

Defendant Bill Taylor

(hereinafter referred to as

Taylor), is a resident of the State of Utah and an Assistant
Vice President of Defendant The Citizens Bank.

4.

Defendant Gary Harris

(hereinafter referred to as

Harris), is a resident of the State of Utah and the President of
Defendant The Citizens Bank.

5.

Defendant The Citizens bank (hereinafter referred

to as Citizens), is a banking institution organized and operated
in the State of Utah with offices in Salt Lake City and Ogden,
Utah.

6.

This Court has jurisdiction over the first cause of

action pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1964(c).

The Court has jurisdic-

tion over the second, third and fourth causes of action which
constitute claims based on State Law which are pendant no and
involve the same facts and circumstances as the federal action.

7.

Venue for this action is proper in the Federal Dis-

trict Court of Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 51391(a) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1965(a) .

*t
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

8.

Defendant Citizens is a commercial bank operating

in the State of Utah which has branch offices in Salt Lake City
and Ogden, Utah.

Said business was organized and operates under

the laws of the State of Utah as a full service banking institution.

In pursuance of the business of Citizens, the means of

interstate commerce are employed on a daily basis.

9.

Defendant Citizens constitutes an "enterprise" as

that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. §1964(4) which is engaged in
and the activites of which affect interstate commerce*

10.

Defendants Taylor and Harris are employed by and

associated with Defendant Citizens and act as officers of that
enterprise.

11.

Prior to February 24, 1981, Plaintiff Strand di-

rected David Floor to open a special account at that brokerage
firm

in

of

Phillip

Thereafter,

Plaintiff

Strand

certificate

Number

common

the

stock

name

SL-001172

to Mr. Floor

Johnson

and The

delivered

Global

representing

with

Citizens Bank.

50,000

instructions

Johnson was

Company

shares

of

that the shares

represented thereby be deposited in that account.
said account was opened, Phillip

Oil

At the time

an officer and

employer of Defendant Citizens and was acting as their agent in
---»-- ~^r< nn

rmpstion.

connection with the transaction.
Defendant

Taylor

Thereafter on January 9, 1985

deposited the same Global Oil

Company

stock

back into account #114325 and directed David Floor to sell said
shares of stock at the best available price over the next five
cays.

Shortly thereafter, on January 23, 1985 Defendants Harris

and Taylor authorized the sale of said shares by Olsen & Company.

Said

sale was ordered by Defendants Harris and Taylor

without judicial foreclosure or notice to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs did not authorize or direct the sale of said stock.

See

Affidavit of Bill Taylor a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "B".

19.

On February

17, 1985, Plaintiff

Strand formally

demanded that Defendants Taylor and Citizens return the stock to
his possession.

Said demand is evidenced by a letter from James

N. Barber acting as Attorney for Plaintiff to Defendant Taylor
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C",

20.

By letter dated February 26, 1985f

and attached

hereto as Exhibit "D,n Defendant Taylor acknowledged receipt of
Plaintiff Strand's demand for return of the stock and explained
that the stock had been sold and the proceeds applied to a debt
between Plaintiff Strand and the Defendant Bank.

21.

The

obligation

mentioned

in

Defendant

Taylor's

letter of February 26, is the renewal of Note Number 32-10156-0
in the principal amount of $390,000 and evidence by a promissory

note dated February

22, 1982.

Said promissory note which is

attached hereto as Exhibit "E* was secured by a Trust Deed on
Plaintiff Strand's residence located at 1199 South 1500 East,
Bountiful, and an airplane hanger located at the Salt Lake International Airport.

22.

The loan identified in paragraph 21 represents the

renewal of an earlier loan between Defendant Citizens and Plaintiff Strand.

23.

On

February

11,

1983,

Defendant

Citizens

and

Plaintiff Strand entered into an agreement whereby they agreed
to defer payment of the debt.

Said extension of the obligation

is evidenced by letter agreement
Exhibit

n

which

is attached hereto as

F\

24.

The Same parties entered into a second agreement

on November 29, 1983 whereby they agreed to accept certain payments from Plaintiff
debt.

Strand

and

defer

repayment of the total

Said agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "G".

25.

Again on October

Defendant Citizens entered

11, 1984, Plaintiff Strand and

into a third agreement whereby De-

fendant Citizens agreed to accept payment of $30,000 from Plaintiff Strand and defer satisfaction

and repayment of the debt

evidenced by the note in question.

Said agreement is evidenced

by writing executed on October 11, 1984, and attached hereto as

Exhibit

n

Hn.

mitted

to

Pursuant to said agreement, Plaintiff Strand re-

Defendant

Citizens

$30,000

from

November

1,

1984

through January 22, 1985.

26.

On or about February 19, 1985, Defendant Taylor

caused notice of trustee's sale of Plaintiff's residence to be
given.

Said sale of the collateral securing the above-mentioned

note was set by Defendants for March 21, 1985.

Said Notice is

attached hereto as Exhibit "I".

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Violation

27.

Plaintiff

Strand

realleges the allegations con-

tained in paragraphs 1 through 26 as if fully stated herein.

28.

Defendant

Citizens

is

a

commercial

enterprise

which is engaged in and the activities of which affect interstate commerce.

29.

During

all

times

material

hereto,

Defendants

Taylor and Harris were employed by said enterprise, and as Assistant Vice-President and President of Defendant Citizens those
Defendants participated as principals in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise.

-8-

30.

On or about January 24, 1985, Defendants Harris

and Taylor authorized the sale of 40,500 shares of Global Oil
common stock which they had previously removed from the special
account at Olsen & Company.

Acting pursuant to said authoriza-

tion, Olsen & Company sold said shares and delivered the proceeds thereof to Defendant Citizens.

31.
account

by

Said shares were previously held in the special
Phillip

Johnson

and

Defendant

Citizens

under

the

bailment in which Plaintiff Strand entrusted said shares to the
protection and control of Phillip Johnson and Defendant Citizens
for the sole and exclusive purpose of repaying certain overdrafts of Overland Oil Field Construction Inc.

32.

At no time, were Defendants Citizens, Harris, or

Taylor the legal or beneficial owners of said shares of stock,

33.

At the time of the sale in question, Plaintiff

Nupetco Associates was the lawful owner of said shares of Global
Oil Company common stock.

34.

Said sale of the 40,500 shares of common stock of

Global by Defendants Harris and Taylor constitutes a chargeable
violation of §76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in
that Defendants Harris and Taylor committed theft by exercising
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.

35.

Pursuant

to

§76-3-203, U.C.A.,

said

offense is

punishable by imprisonment for more than a year and constitutes
a predicate act or predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. §1961(1)(A).

36.

Following said sale, Defendants Harris and Taylor

have failed and refused to return said shares of common stock to
Plaintiff
notice

Strand.

In

addition,

said

of a trustee's sale to be

Strand's

residence.

Said

notice

Defendants

issued
was

have

against

issued

after

caused

Plaintiff's
Plaintiff

Strand demanded the return of the shares of stock and following
his refusal to authorize the application of the proceeds from
the sale of said stock to the indebtedness secured by that residence .

37.

The authorization of said trustee's sale under the

present circumstances constitutes a threat by Defendants Harris
and Taylor to do an act which would not in itself substantially
benefit the individual defendants but which would harm substantially Plaintiff Strand with respect to his financial condition,
reputation and personal relationships.

38.

Said act of authorizing and directing notice of

Trustee's sale was undertaken by Defendants Harris and Taylor
after they had exercised control over the property of another to
wit, the common stock of Global Oil and said acts were done with
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the purpose of permanently depriving the lawful owner possession
of the stock.

39.

Said threat of Trustee's sale constitues a charge-

able violation of §76-6-406, U.C.A., Theft by Extortion, which
is punishable by imprisonment for more than a year and constitutes

a predicate

act or predicate

offense

under

18 U.S.C,

§1961(1)(A).

40.

Prior to November 1984, Defendants had renewed the

loan between Defendant Citizens and Plaintiff Strand which was
originally evidenced by Promissory Note Number 32-10156-0.

As

described above, on several occassions, those parties entered
into agreements both implicit and express whereby the repayment
or satisfaction of said debt was deferred.

All these renewals,

the last of which occured on October 11, 1984, constitute extensions of credit as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. §891(1).

41.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §891(4) the repayment of any

extension of credit includes the repayment, satisfaction or discharge in whole or in part of any debt resulting from or in connection with that extension of credit.

42.

To collect an extension of credit is defined in 19

U.S.C. § 891(5) to mean to induce in any way any person to make
repayment thereof.

43.

Collection by extortionate means is defined by 18

U.S.C. §891(7) to include any means involving the use of, an
express or implicit threat or use of violence or other criminal
means

to cause harm to the person's reputation, property or any

person.

44.

Defendants Harris and Taylor's unauthorized sale

of the Global stock and application of the proceeds therefrom to
repayment of the previous extension of credit constitute a theft
of said property and the repayment of a portion of an extension
of credit by the use of criminal means and is an indictable act
under 18 U.S.C. §894.

45.

Said application of the proceeds of the sale to

the loan and the issuance of the notice of Trustee's sale to
induce Plaintiff Strand to ratify said application of proceeds
constitutes an attempt to collect an extension of credit by the
use

of extortionate

means

and

constitutes

an

act

indictable

under 18 U.S.C. §894.

46.

Both the unauthorized application of the proceeds

of the theft and the threat of sale of Plaintiff Strand's residence if he did not ratify said illegal acts, are predicate acts
or predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. S1961(l)(5).
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47.

Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 pro-

vides that it shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or
sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or

communications

in interstate commerce or by

the use of the mails, to directly or indirectly(2) obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading. . .
48.

At the time Defendants Harris and Taylor offered

the 40,500 shares of common stock of Global Oil, for sale, they
did not disclose to Olsen & Company or to the purchaser of said
shares that they knew Defendant

Citizens were not the lawful

owners of that stock and that they did not have authorization
from the Plaintiffs for the offer or sale,

49.

Said

lack

of ownership or authorization, was a

material fact the disclosure of which was necessary in order to
make the statements made, i.e., the directive to sell the stock,
not misleading.

50.

Said material omission was employed by Defendants

Harris and Taylor" in order to obtain money or property by means
of the material
stock .

omissions and

the unauthorized

sale

of said

51.

Said offer and sale of the securities were accom-

plished by the use of means and instruments of communication in
interstate commerce and by the use of the mails.

52.

The failure of Defendants to disclose the illegal

and unauthorized nature of the offer and sale of the securities
constitutes a violation of §17(a)(2) of the Securities Act of
1933.

53.

The offering and sale of the securities by Defend-

ants Harris and Taylor represent an offense involving fraud in
the sale of securities and constitutes a predicate act or offense under 18 U.S.C. S1961(1)(D).

54.

The above described acts constitute a "pattern of

racketeering activity" as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C, §
1961(5), to wit, at least two chargeable or indictable acts one
of which occured after the effective date of §1961 and the last
of which occured within ten years after the commission of the
prior act.

55.

Defendants Harris and Taylor engaged in this pat-

tern of racketeering activity in connection with their employment with Defendant Citizens and in relation to their conduct of
the business affairs of that enterprise.
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56.

The above-described acts constitute a violation of

18 U.S.C. §1962(c) and subjects those defendants to Plaintiff
Strand's

private

action

remedies

as

provided

by

18

U.S.C.

§1964(c) .

57.

Said

acts of Defendants have deprived Plaintiff

Strand of possession of the 40,500 shares of common stock of
Global Oil.

On March 4, 1985, demand was made upon Plaintiff

Strand to return said shares to Plaintiff Nupetco Associates or
make payment of the value thereof.

Pursuant to said demand and

as a result of Defendants' refusal to return the stock, Plaintiff Strand has become indebted to Plaintiff Nupetco Associates
in the total amount of $368,550.

58.

The Defendants1 pattern of racketeering activities

have therefore damaged Plaintiff

Strand

in the amount of the

purchase price of said shares at the time he was required to
deliver the same to Plaintiff Nupetco Associates.

Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. §1964(c) Plaintiff Strand may recover from Defendants
Harris and Taylor, threefold the damages he has suffered and the
costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE,

the

Plaintiff

Strand

prays

for

Judgment

against Defendants Taylor and Harris jointly and severally under
the First Cause of Action as Follows:

1,

For the award of treble damages as provided by law

in the amount of $1,105,650 plus prejudgment interest at the
rate of 12% from January 23, 1985.

2.

For costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's

fees as provided by 18 U.S.C. §1964(c); and

3.

For any other relief the Court deems just and rea-

sonable .

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Violation

59.

Plaintiffs reallege the allegations contained in

paragraphs 1 through 58 as if fully stated herein.

60.

Defendants unauthorized sale of the Global common

stock constitutes the exercise of unauthorized control over the
property of another with the purpose to deprive the lawful owner
thereof and constitutes an illegal act committed for financial
gain to wit, theft.

61.

Said acts of Defendants Taylor and Harris in exer-

cising control over the stock in question constitute racketeering as that term is defined by §76-10-1602 (l)(q), U.C.A.
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62.
basis

of

that

Plaintiffs

are informed

information

and

belief

and believe
allege

and on the

that

Defendants

Taylor and Harris authorized the issuance of Notice of Trustee's
Sale involving Plaintiff Strand's residence following Plaintiff
Strand!s refusal to ratify

their misappropriation

of the pro-

ceeds of their illegal sale of the Global stock.

63.

Said

threat

of

a

trustee's

sale

of

Plaintiff

Strand's residence can not in itself substantially benefit Defendants Taylor and Harris but will cause Plaintiff Strand substantial harm with respect to his financial condition, reputation, and personal relationships.

64.

Said

act constitutes

extortion

as

that term is

defined by 76-6-406(1)(i), U.C.A.

65.

Defendants1

threats

to

sell

Plaintiff

Strand's

residence at a trustee's sale, following his refusal to ratify
'Defendants missappropriation of the Global Stock was done for
the explicit reason of coercing Plaintiff Strand's acquiesce in
the Defendants' prior illegal acts and constitutes an attempt to
commit theft by extortion.

66.

Pursuant

to §76-10-1602(1) (g) and

(x), said act

constitutes racketeering by Defendants Taylor and Harris.

67.

Defendant

Taylor's

application

of

the proceeds

from the unauthorized sale of the Global stock to the renewed
obligation between Plaintiff Strand and Defendant Citizens constitutes

the collection of an extension of credit by use of

criminal means, i.e., theft.

68.

Said use of criminal means to collect the exten-

sion of credit is an act of racketeering as that term is defined
by §76-10-16.02(l)(k).

69.

The sale of the securities in question by Defend-

ant's Harris and Taylor without disclosure of the fact that they
nor Defendant Citizens was the owner of said shares constitutes
an act

of

fraud

in the

sale

of securities

and

pursuant to

§76-10-1602(1)(u) constitutes racketeering by said Defendants.

70.

The

various

acts

enumerated

above

which

were

undertaken by Defendants Taylor and Harris establish a pattern
of racketeering activity as defined by §76-10-1602(4).

71.
by

Said pattern' of racketeering activity was employed

Defendants'

Harris

and

Taylor

as

employees

of

Defendant

Citizens, an enterprise, to conduct the business activities of
that enterprise and constitutes a violation of §76-10-1603(3).

72.

As a result of the pattern of racketeering, Plain-

tiff Strand has suffered damages in the amount of $368,550 and
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Plaintiff Nupetco has suffered the loss of the value of the securities in question.

Pursuant to §76-10-1605

Plaintiffs may

recover from Defendants Taylor and Harris, treble damages, the
costs of suit, including

reasonable

attorney's

fees,

and any

judgment

against

punitive damages the court may deem reasonable.

WHEREFORE, the
Defendants

Taylor

Plaintiffs

and Harris

pray

for

jointly and severally

under the

Second Cause of Action, as follows:

1.

For an award of treble damages as provided by law

in the amount of $1,105,650 plus prejudgment interest at a rate
of 12% from January 23, 1985.

2.

For costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's

fees as provided by §76-10-1605(1);

3.

For Punitive damages in an amount the Court deter-

mines to be appropriate; and

4.
sonable .

For any other relief the Court deems just and rea-

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Conversion

73.

Plaintiff Strand reallege the allegations made

m

paragraphs 1 through 72 as if fully stated herein, Plaintiff
Nupetco realleges the allegations made in paragraph 1 through 26
and 60 through 72 as if fully stated herein.

74.

As the Bailor of said shares of common stock of

Global Oil, Plaintiff Strand had a right to regain possession of
said scares from Defendant Citizens.

75.

On or aoout, February 7, 1985, Plaintiff Strand

requested the Defendant Citizens to return the stocK in question
to his possession.

76.

Defendant refused to return said stock or conform-

ing shares of Global Oil common stock to the possession and control of Plaintiff Strand, notwithstanding repeated written requests for its return.

77.
stock

which

Said
has

acts

damaged

constitute
Plaintiff

conversion

of

Strand

the

m

the

common

amount

of

£368,550.

V7HEREFORE, Plaintiff Strand prays for Judgment against
all Defendants jointly and severally under the Third Cause of
Action, as follows:
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1.

For an award of actual damages in the amount of

Jp368,550 plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from January 23, 1985.

2.

For punitive damages for the intentional conversion

of the property in an amount to be determined at trial; and

3.

For any other relief the court deems just and rea-

sonable,

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Conversion

78.

Plaintiff Strand reallege the allegations made in

paragraphs 1 through 77 as if fully stated herein.
Nupetco

realleges

the

allegations

contained

in

Plaintiff

paragraph

1

through 26 and 60 through 77 as if fully stated herein.

79.

Plaintiff Nupetco Associates is the owner of said

shares of common stock of Global Oil.

80.
an

Defendants sale of said common stock constitutes

intentional

ownership

conversion

interest

which

of
has

Plaintiff
damaged

Nupetco

Associates1

Plaintiff

Associates in an amount to be determined at trial.

Nupetco

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Nupetco prays for judgment against
all Defendants jointly and severally under the Fourth Cause of
Action as follows:

1.

For an award of actual damages in an amount to be

determined at trial plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 12%
per annum upon the amount from January 23, 1985.

2.

For punitive damages for the intentional conversion

of the shares of common stock in an amount to be determined at
trial; and

3.

For

any

other

relief

the Court

deems

just and

reasonable.

Dated this .gSfc* day of September, 1985,
JACKSON & WILKINSON
40 East South Temple, Suite 310
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

EL W. JACKSON
MOYLE & DRAPER
600 Deseret Plaza
N. 15 East First South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
>y

'W^
WAYNE^G. PETTY

/

Plaintiff's Addresses:
Michael Strand; 1199 South 1500 East, Bountiful, UT 84010
Plaintiff Nupetco Associates; 2006 South
City, Utah 84106

900 East, Salt Lake

DANIEL W. JACKSON
BRADLEY, ARROWSMITH & JACKSON
40 East South Temple, S u i t e 310
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84111
Telephone (801) 363-1919

M^R Ei . B ' - l ^ ' S S
^ "
.H« U^fc*

OUR*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
Central Division
MICHAEL STRAND,

)
\•

Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT

;

BILL TAYLOR, GARY HARRIS,
and THE CITIZENS BANK,

!)

Civil No. C85-0315W

Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH

)
• ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
Comes

now Lohr

Livingston, being

first

duly

sworn,

deposes and says:
1,

Prior to September, 1982, Affiant was a Senior Vice

President of The Citizens Bank,
2. Pursuant to his duties with The Citizen Bank, Affiant participated as the Loan Officer in relation to February 22,
1982 loan from the Bank to Plaintiff Mike Strand.

3.

Prior to the execution of the Promissory Note evi-

dencing said indebtedness, the bank extended certain short term
advances to Plaintiff in anticipation of the closing of said
loan,

4.

Prior to the negotiations between the parties rela*

tive to the laon in Question and the advancement of monies in
reliance on the closing of the loan, Plaintiff had repaid all
obligations between himself and The Citizens Bank,

5.

The exclusive collateral

forthe loan of February

22, consisted of Plaintiff's personal residence and a airplane
hanger which was owned by Plaintiff,

5,

The 40,500 shares of Global stock were not pledged

as collateral for the February loan,

7,

At the time of the execution of the February loan,

all collateral

including the stock in auestion prior loans or

other obligations of Plaintiff, were released from any and all
security interests held by the Bank,

Dated this /-7-V, day of Harch, 1985.

LOHR LlVlNGST-olT''

^w^-v
(/
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^

Subscribed
March, 1985,

and sworn

to before

me this

.•V-"

•<^~

day

' r i '

NO I'AKY WHLlC, r e s i d i n g , at
Fly Commission Expires

< • •*»-. „-, /

/

/ /:,,.

7
s I

of

zfreowd ir-ev-e soos/g/e

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVISrOlMfffpo
*gOAfn,/9ft

BOUNTIFUL DEPARTMENT, STATE OF U T A H
GOLDEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES, L.C.,
AKA GOLDEN MEADOWS PROPERTIES,
L.L.C.,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
>
)
)

vs.

)

MICHAEL W. STRAND AND CARI
ALLEN,

)

)

Defendants.

S r

#fc

f

r

?

AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL W. JACKSON

Civil No. 070700488
Judge Glen R. Dawson

)
)
)
)
Affidavit of I

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

070700488 STRAND.MICHAEL W "°~

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Daniel W. Jackson being first duly sworn depose and say:
1.

I have been a member of the Utah State Bar since 1979. I am over 21 years of age

and have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein and would testify to those facts if
called as a witness in this case.
2.

From July, 1981 through approximately the summer of 1989, I represented

Michael W. Strand ("Strand") in numerous transactional and litigation matters.
3.

In the course of my representation of Strand, I met Neuman C. Petty ("Petty") and

from the late summer of 1981 through the winter of 1988,1 had occasion on innumerable

i

occasions to meet with Strand and Petty, travel with Strand and Petty and witness interactions
between the two individuals.
4.

On or about September 14, 1982, C.I.T. Corporation obtained a judgment against

Strand for $342,826.76 with 12% interest from September 2, 1982, together with $3,200.00
attorney fees, and $115.25 costs in which the transcript of judgment was filed on September 16,
1982, as Civil No. 9576, docket no. S-345, Davis County Clerk's Office.
5.

At the time the above-described transcript of judgment was filed, Strand was the

owner of the real property more particularly described as:
04-062-0203
All of Lot 203, CANYON CREST PLAT NUMBER "9," a subdivision of part of Section 28, Township 2, North, Range 1 East,
Salt Lake Meridian, in the City of bountiful, according to the
official plat thereof.
Which I understand is the subject matter of the above-captioned action and was the personal
residence of Strand and his wife.
6.

Following the filing of the above-described transcript of judgment, Strand and

Petty engaged in a course of business dealings under which Strand would assign his assets to
Pelty and Petty would provide Strand with money to conduct his business affairs and cover his
personal living expenses.
7.

In furtherance of this course of business, I had several conversations with Strand

and Petty wherein I described the effects of assignments of interest and foreclosures on the
interests of judgment creditors and discussed with Strand and Petty approaches that could be
employed to protect assets owned by Strand from the reach of his numerous creditors including
but not limited to C.I.T. Corporation,
2

8.

Strand and Petty employed my advice and entered into several assignments of

interest wherein Strand would assign personal property to Petty or his alter ego Nupetco
Associates based upon Petty's financing of Strand's livelihood.
9.

Following such assignments, Strand would continue to retain control of the

underlying asset for the benefit of himself and Petty.
10.

One such assignment occurred on April 27, 1983, when for the consideration of

one dollar and other good and valuable consideration, Strand and his wife assigned a mortgage
held by them in a car dealership in Burley, Idaho to Nupetco Associates. (Exhibit 1)
11.

On October 11, 1985, Strand obtained a judgment in the Third Judicial District

Court against the mortgagors of the above-referenced mortgage declaring the mortgage to be
valid with an unpaid balance of principal and interest in the amount of $522,769.72. (Exhibit 2)
12.

Strand's assignment of that mortgage to Petty was made in consideration of

Petty's promise to protect Strand's ownership in the real property described above in paragraph 5
and to continue to work in cooperation with Strand to further their joint business interests.
13.

Petty did not release public notice of the above-described assignment until

October 18, 1985, just days after he obtained title to Strand's personal residence. (Exhibit 3)
14.

Between April, 1983 and September, 1985,1 was personally present on several

occasions wherein Strand and Petty discussed the debt owing on Strand's personal residence and
how to deal with that debt and the other creditors of Strand while allowing Strand to retain the
possession, use and beneficial ownership of that property.
15.

The plan that emerged from these meetings and discussions was that Petty would

either purchase the debt owed to Citizens Bank directly from the Bank and foreclose the

3

indebtedness for Strand's protection or bid at any foreclosure sale scheduled by the creditor bank
and acquire the property free and clear of all similar liens.
16.

In both of the scenarios described above, Petty was acquiring the property for the

benefit of Strand in consideration of the various assignments, transfers and conveyances of
personal property given by Strand to Petty in furtherance of their ongoing business arrangement.
17.

Throughout 1984, 1985 and 1986, Strand and Petty worked in absolute concert to

obtain the full benefit of the Idaho mortgage. This included cooperative legal actions ongoing in
Utah and Idaho in the name of Strand and Petty. (Exhibit 4)
18.

The actions of Petty and Strand throughout the period in question were directed at

maximizing the value of Strand's assets for the purpose of benefitting both Strand and Petty.
DATED this 28th day of February, 2008

DANIEL W. JACKSON
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Before me a Notary Public, in and for said state, on this 28th day of February, 2008,
personally appeared Daniel W. Jackson to me known to be the identical person who executed the
within and foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same as his free
and voluntary act and deed for the uses and purposes therein set forth.
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^

^

fUSSSSm. I
2157 Lincoln 3W«t
Salt Uk* City. Ulah 6*106
March 7.2011

State oKJtah ^

){'v t u n

Notary Public
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EXHIBIT 1

WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:
Wayne G. Petty, Esq.
MOYLE I DRAPER, P.C.
6GQ Deaeret Plaza
#15 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE
Michael W, Strand and Lois Strand, Assignors, in
consideration of One Dollar and other good and valuable
consideration, paid by Nupetco Associates, 2006 South 900
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, Assignee, hereby assign
unto the Assignee, its successors and assigns, a certain
Second Mortgage made by Leland Maxtineau, Charles Waters
and Magic Valley Property, a partnership comprised of the
aforementioned individuals, as Mortgagors, to Michael W.
Strand and Lois Strand, Mortgagees, given to secure indebtedness between the parties in varying awaunts, but in excess of
$200,000, dated the 10th day of June, 19&0, recorded on the
24th day of September, 1980, in the office of the recorder
of the County of Cassia, State of Idaho, as Entry No. 129331,
covering the following described premises situated in said
County:
Lots 18, Id and 20, Block 3, Johnson's Subdivision
to the City of Bur ley, County of Cassia, State of Idaho.
Together with the bond or note or obligation described
in said Mortgage, and the »onies due and to grow due thereon
with the interest.
To have and to hold the seiae unto the Assignee and
to the successors, legal representatives and assigns of the
Assignee forever.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Assignors have duly executed
this Assignment the £ 7 g d a y of
ftf>*x\i 1983.

Hicha^l- w; Strand

i s Strand1
STATE OF UTAH

COUNW

'

ki^

>

QF^OjMLt)

On t h e ,?)'( day of {• i \ \ \ i \
, 19B3, p e r s o n a l l y
appeared b e f o r e roe Michael W. S t r a n d and Lois S t r a n d , t h e
s i g n e r s of t h e f o r e g o i n g instrument, who duly acknowledged
t o me that they executed t h e same.

My Commission E x p i r e s :

4-/0- as-

— _JMTTARY P H B L I C J

y

-*t,

\

A \

Teaia^W^^ <jk I*

123331
SECOND KOkTCACE

LELAHD MARTIHEAU, of Sale Lake City, Silt Lake County
State or Utan, and CHARLES W A T E R S , and H A C K VALLEY rROPEtTY.
a partnership comprised of the eforestentloned Individuals, of
fturicy. County of Cassia, State of Idaho, Mortgagors, hereby
HQRTGACE to MICHAEL U. STRAND and LOIS STRAND, mortgagees
of Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah for tit* lua of
TEN ($10,00) DOLLARS the following described

tract of land in

Burley, County of Cassia, State of Idaho:
Lots IB, 19, and 20 Ulock 3, Johnson's Subdivision
to the City of parley, County of Cassia, State of Idaho
This Second, Mortage is given to secure the tndebtness
between the parties in varying amounts, but presently in excess
of ,:'u0,000.00.
The mortgagors Agree to pay ell taxes and assessments on
said premises end a reasonable attorney's fee in case of foreclosure.
UlTNESS the hands of said mortgagors, this
June, I960.

/&OS day of

STATE Of UTAH
as,
COUKTY OF SALT LAKE
On this 10th day of June, 19&0, personally appeared before
ne Loland A, Hartineau, the signer of the within instruftcnt, yho
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the ««•*.

^J^SAU-.
Notary Public
Betiding at Sale Lake City, Utah
My Comiislon Expires:

STATE OF tU22£
COUNTY Of &&SS&A
On the

/£££*** day of June, H B O , personally appeared before

»e Charles Waters, the signer of the within instrument, who duly
acknowledged to tie that he executed the sea*.

Hotary Public
Residing at; J^J^
My Ccmmifision Expires;

fi*

^

^tijt*

•'
^ t ^

^ >^*
A .
...".
. r^s»,» •
• r
p y..t

en

hU%
STATE OF (tftol

^ & ^ h

"H§

•S 1 -

COUNTY OF SM^T JLAX&
On the /aT** day of June, I960, person
** *=£&&[&

^

A . /J^X/4B/H\

appeared Before

a partner in Haglc Valley Property,

who duly acknowledged to »c (hat ho executed the sa*e.

Notary fubiic ,
kz>
^Keaiding at; ^eU^U^JU.
Hy Commission Expires:

^ •
&&fr

c*>

EXHIBIT 2

United States of America
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District
In and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
I, p h i l i p R« F i s h i e r
Presiding Judge of the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and
lor the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, do hereby certify thai said Court is a Court of Record, having a Clerk and a
seal; that H. Dixon Hind ley who signed the attestation, is the duly elected and qualified County Clerk of the County of
Salt Lake, State of Utah, and was at the time ot signing said attestation Ex-Officio Clerk of the said District Court; thai
said signature is his genuine handwriting; and that all his official acts as such Clerk are entitled to full faith and credit.
And I further certifv that said attestation is in due form of law.
Witness my hand this

STATE OF UTAH

2 1

February ^

AI

Q . 19 86_

.
>

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

day nC-

ss.

*

L H. Dixon Hindle>. County Clerk and Ex-Officio Clerk ofsaid District Court of the County of Salt Lake, Stateof
Utah, do hereby certify that the Honorable
P h i l i p R.Fishier
whose name is subscribed to the
preceding certificate, is one of the Judges ofsaid Court, duly commissioned and qualified, and that the signature ofsaid
Judge to said certificate is genuine.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. 1 have hereunto set my hand and affixed the !>eal ofsaid Court, this
day of F e b r u a r y
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JOHN 3\ CAINE #0536
RICHARDS, CAINE 4 RICHARDS
Attorney for
Plaintiff
2568 5. Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone:
8Q1 399-4191
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL V. STRAND and MLK INVESTMENTS,
a
partnership,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGEMENT
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ISLAND A. MARTINEAU, CHARLES WATERS,
MAGIC VALLEY aOTQRS, INC., and MAGIC
VALLSY PROPERTIES, a
partnership,

Civil

¥: 3 JT as?**,

No. C-$3-56ao

Defendants.

This matter

having

the Honorable Scott Pamela,
being personally

present

Martineau being

Carman Kipp*

The trial

fully

and the parties

advised

personally

having
having

in the premise

trial

on September

Judge of the above entitled

and represented

the defendant

defendant

come on for

by their
present

3, 1995

Court,

attorney

before
plaintiffs

John T. Caine and

and represented

by his

attorney

commenced and a motion having been mada by the
stipulated

to certain

now makes the following

facts
order

and the Court
and

being

judgement:

J.

The mortgage attached
hereto as Exhibit
"A" is a valid
mortgage given to the plaintiff,
Michael Strand by
leland Martineau and Charles Waters to secure an
obligation
of $327,989.25 which obligation
was incurred on or about May 24,
1979 and which obligation
bears interest
at the rate of 8%
from July 1, 1950 t o July 1, 1981 and 12% per annum thereafter
until paid in full,
with an unpaid balance of principle
and
interest
a*, of October 11, 1985 of
$522,769.72,

2.

That any defenses
which defendants
may have against the
validity
of i>~+ mortgage under either
Utah or Idaho lav are hereby
waived.

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

I, H. DIXON HINDLEY, Clerk in and for the County of Salt Lake and Ex-Officio
Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of the original

1 Copy of Order and Judgment

( O c t . 3 1 , 1985)

Michael W. S t r a n d a n d MLK I n v e s t m e n t
vs.
Leland A. M a r t i n e a u , C h a r l e s W a t e r s ,
Magic V a l l e y M o t o r s , I n c . and Magic
Valley P r o p e r t i e s
Case No.

C-83-5680

as appears of record in my office.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
and affixed my official seal, this
day of

By

,21st

^£^ruary

"ANX^^W-UJ^

A>D<

r>/-VNA^^5^

1

TO 86

Dfc£uty Clerk

2
3.

Ifcat p«rauant to Section 75-37-1 (/d laa amended 1953),
toat plaintiff* ara r«quir«<f to foreclose aaid »ort$rag*
aaainat tit* property which is located in C***i* County.
State of Idaho oefore proceeding rnqtinrnt tne peraooei
aeeetfl of the defendant Mirttneeu.

4,

Skat ail
•ail havo
eefenaee
r*#«r*otf

other claims which either party to thie actios
affainat toe ether, with thm ax captioo of thoee
specifically waived in ptxmgrmph Z art hereby
and regain pendin* in thie Court.

U*»P U i a i l t h day of Octooer, l*d5.

^<a^«**u'fl;
SCOTT OlMXfLS
MSJWCT cowr

Jt/oc*

ATTEST

EXHIBIT 3

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that Michael W. Strand and Lois
Strand,

of the County of Davis,

judgement obtained against
Motors, inc.,

State

of Utah, hereby give notice

Leland A. Martineau,

and Magic Valley Properties,

1985, in the District

that

the

Charles Waters, Magic Valley

a partnership,

Court of the Third Judicial

District

dated October 11,
Court in and for

Salt Lake County, State of Utah (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A")
i s subject

to and governed by that certain

Assignment of Mortgage wherein

Michael W. strand and Lois Strand as assignors,
2006 South 900 East that certain

obligation

second mortgage made by Leland A. Martineau,
Properties

a copy of which is attached

IN WITNESS whereof this

assigned to Wupetco Associates,

which is secured by a certain
Charles Waters and Magic Valley

as Exhibit

/f*Tiau

»B\

of October,

1985.

>>r^^*»
MICHAEL W. STRAND

LOIS STRAND
NUPETCO ASSOCIATES

*K2J&tmctid.

EXHIBIT 4

PARSONS, S M I T H , S T O N E S. FLETCHER
Wh.JAM A

PAfiSCNS

ATTORNEYS
137 W E S T
BU^LtY.

AT LAW

13T. S T 8 E E T
IDAHO

833J8

p o e o x £10
T£wEPHONE
1208)
678-8332

December 27, 1985

Mr. John T. Caine
Attorney at Law
2563 S. Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 34401
Dear John:
I am writing to you so that it is clear what Neuman
will be asking you to obtain•
Based on the Judgment that you obtained in Civil
Case C-83-5680 in the Third Judicial District of the State
of Utah we filed on behalf of Nupetco the foreclosure of the
Mortgage as the same had been assigned by Strand.
Martineau now has moved to dismiss the action and
raises a couple of issues and the most important issue is the
statute of limitations. In view of the provision of the Judgment
that any defenses which they may have against the validity of
the Mortgage either under Utah or Idaho law are hereby waived,
I would appreciate a transcript as to what was waived. It
could be argued that the vaiidity of the mortgage was waived
but I am confident that the limitations of action will be an
issue. I an enclosing a copy of Idaho Code 5-214A which is
the limitation of the section that I am concerned about.
Assuming for a moment that the defendants prevail in
that Supetco is barred from bringing its action, then can you
not proceed against the personal assets of Martineau by virtue
of the Judgment?
As you can see, John, I neBd all the help I can get
so that our client is protected.
Even if the waiver was totally complete I am still
somewhat concerned about the first paragraph of the statute
as it was not recorded in the courthouse.
If the mortgage does net survive in Idaho, then
perhaps we would be in a position to sue on the Judgment as a
foreign judgment with the amount due of ?522,000.00. The
qnly problem with that is that there is an intervening tax lien
to the State of Idaho but which may expire by the lapse of time.

Page 2 - John T. Caine
December 27, 1985

I guess anorher possibiliry would be for Nuperco
ro buy our Equirable and hope rhar rhere was a defaulr in
char regard•
I have somewhar rambled in rhis letrer bur I wanred
ro have you aware of rhe problems I am facing in rhe foreclosure
and a copy of rhe transcripr would cerrainly help insofar as
whar rhar waiver really means.
Very rruly yours

William A. Larsons

WAP:rr
Enc.
cc:

Neuman C« Perty

P A R S O N S , S M I T H , STONE 5. FLETCHER
W Li. I A M A
r-A^SONb
HfCHARD A 5MITH
S 4 N D O i . P H C. S > T O N £
V\ M x t . \ T F L L T C H C R

ATTOPNCYS

AT LAW

. 3 7 W E S " 13™ S T R E E T
BURLEY,

IDAHO

83318

P C

BOX 9 I C

TELEPHONE
1208}
678-8382

April 29, 1986

John T. Caine
Attorney at Law
2 568 South Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Neuman Petty
Nupetco
2006 South 9th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
RE:

Nupetco Associates v. Martineau, et al

Gentlemen:
Enclosed are copies of the Answer, Motion for the
Payment of Costs and Motion to Set Aside Foreign Judgment which
have been filed in the above case.
Vera/ truly yojTXS,
f/^c ^ wr
stasia
William A. Parsons

WAP:rt
Enc.

